ANNEX 3

USE OF INTERNET IN PROPELLING THE POEs

1. Social media play an important role in the POEs.[1] Digital media have served as a vital hub of information circulation for protesters. According to a survey published in March 2020 conducted by Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, people often relies on online news media (over 80% to nearly 100%), Facebook (roughly 80% to 90%) and the online discussion forum LIHKG (roughly 50% to 90%) as sources of information about the movement against traditional media (roughly 40% to 60%)[2] Digital media also have served as a platform through which people can participate in the POEs. In particular, protesters often use different platforms such as Facebook, Telegram and LIHKG to distribute movement-related information and discuss issues.[3]

2. In general, protesters use online discussion forums such as LIHKG and messaging app such as Telegram for coordination and communication.[4] They use these forums and apps to share information, discuss tactics and evaluate the effectiveness of tactics after every protest.[5] LIHKG allows crowd ranking by pushing the most popular thread to the top.[6] Telegram groups can have up to 200 000 members and public channels can have unlimited number of subscribers.[7] These features of LIHKG and Telegram facilitate the discussion and dissemination of information. Protesters also recognise Twitter as a global platform to get the message out to audiences outside Hong Kong. While some people praised the artistic creativity of the publicity materials,[8] others criticised such materials as helping to promote

---

1 49% of those aged 15 to 34 regarded Telegram was important for getting information about the protests, while 61 per cent in that age group felt the LIHKG platform was important for such information. And about a fifth of those aged 55 and above also found Telegram and LIHKG.

SCMP (2019-10-12). Older Hongkongers taking to online apps and social media for latest updates on protests, and some may join rallies too. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3032496/older-hongkongers-taking-online-apps-and-social-media

2 Research Report on Public Opinion during The Anti-extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong published by Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, March 2020

3 Ibid.

4 The Washington Post (2019-09-30). The Hong Kong protests have been going on for months. What explains this sustained action? Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/30/hong-kong-protests-have-been-going-months-what-explains-this-sustained-action/

5 SCMP (2019-09-28). From Occupy 2014 to protests 2019. Retrieved from https://multimedia.scmp.com/infographics/news/hong-kong/article/3030696/from-occupy-to-hong-kong-protests/index.html

6 LIHKG. LIHKG 常見問題. Retrieved from https://lihkg.com/thread/1660096/page/1

7 Telegram. FAQ. Retrieved from https://telegram.org/faq#q-what-39s-the-difference-between-groups-and-channels

8 BBC (2019-12-12). The powerful images of Hong Kong's protests. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20191211-the-powerful-images-of-hong-kongs-protests

violence and smear the Police.[9] This part of the chapter would examine how the POEs continues and evolves with the use of the internet.

A. Appealing and mobilising people to take part in protests and use violence in the protests

Unifying Protesters

3. The POEs have been described as leaderless or “no central stage”. Yet, the internet, as an efficient and effect platform for mass communication of information or exchange of ideas, serves to unify the protesters.

4. The demands of the protests have been stated in the beginning, and changed over time at different stages. The “Five Demands” first emerged in written form at the conclusion of the protest on 16 June 2019. The demand for “setting up an independent commission of inquiry” for police probe was first raised in June 2019 and has become increasingly prominent and persistent since July 2019. Thereafter, the slogan “Five Demands, Not One Less” has been used in subsequent public meetings or processions. The “Five Demands” have then evolved as :

(a) Full withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Bill
(b) A commission of inquiry into alleged police brutality
(c) Retracting the classification of protesters as “rioters”
(d) Amnesty for arrested protesters
(e) Dual universal suffrage

5. Since mid-July 2019, the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times” has again been popularised in the protests and has been chanted and sprayed as graffiti by protesters.

[9] Takungpao (2019-08-24). 止暴制亂\亂港文宣機器網上狂煽暴. Retrieved from http://www.takungpao.com.hk/news/232109/2019/0824/340225.html

Image 1: Poster containing the slogan title ‘Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times’ with timing of 31 August 2019 at Chater Garden
(Image source: LIHKG)

6. Since August 2019, “disband the Police Force” has emerged as a new demand. The demands has been circulating on the internet to connect protesters.

Image 2: Poster stating ‘Six Demands Not One Less’, the additional demand on top of the ‘Five Demands’ is ‘Disband the Police Force’
(Image source: Facebook)

Appealing by Posts with Sentimental Messages

7. It is undeniable that many people would, at different extents, moved or motivated by sentimental news, messages or pictures. The most iconic image of the "Yellow Raincoat" at the early stage of the protests originated from the incident that a male fell from height on 15 June 2019. Protesters were motivated by his death to take part in the procession on 16 June 2019, which turned out to be the largest protest in HK history. The deceased's yellow raincoat had since became an icon.

Image 3: Protest art from HK streets illustrate how people feel about fugitive bill
(Image Source: LIHKG)

8. Being saddened by the incident, some netizens asked people to come out on 16 June 2019 to show support in denouncing the Government who should be responsible and "repay by blood":

Image 4: A post on 15 June 2019 asking Hong Kong people to come out on 16 June to show support in denouncing the Government for being responsible and must 'repay by blood'

(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 5: Some netizens stated that s/he 'decided to join the protest on 16 June 2019 on behalf of the male'

(Image source: LIHKG)

9. Two suicide cases happened at the end of June touched the hearts of many people. A young girl aged 21 committed suicide on 29 Jun 2019. Before she jumped down from height, she wrote her last words on the wall in red and posted onto her Instagram urging others to persevere the fight. It has been widely circulated on the internet.



Image 6: The 'Suicide Note' asking all Hong Kong people not to forget and to persevere in the 'Five Demands'

(Image source: Instagram)

10. News articles filled the internet stating the brief personal background of the deceased and the content of the 'Suicide Note'. She stated that "I wish to spend my life for the wish of 2 million people. Please persist to fight!"

11. Within 24 hours, another lady aged 29 jumped off from IFC on 30 June 2019. She stated on her Facebook that "Hong Kong persevere, I wish to see you succeed. I cannot go on 1 July… Thanks for everyone's love, grateful for each encounter".[10] The next day, 1 July 2019 protesters stormed the LegCo Complex.

[10] Apple Daily (2019-06-30). 【引渡惡法】29 歲女子中環 ifc 墮樓亡 fb 留遺言：七一我去不了. Retrieved from https://hk.news.appledaily.com/breaking/realtime/article/20190630/59773700

Image 7: News article stating the death of the “29 year old female” and
the content of her post on Facebook
(Image source: Facebook)

Motivating People’s Participation of Events

12. Since June 2019, various publicity materials are circulated on the internet to solicit supports and enlist participants for various activities or protests. Starting from July 2019, netizens had been familiar with this kind of “Events Calendar” calling for support of the activities.

Image 8: These are examples of event calendars that called for support of the activities.

(Image source: NearSnake)

13. The promotional materials are effective as they are able to present numerous elements or multi information by a single visual aid. Sometimes, by using a punch line slogan or art work, the author could catch people’s attention to the core details of an activity.

Image 9: Posters calling for all citizens to go on labour strike on 5 August 2019

(Image source: LIHKG)

14. For instance, there are many posts on the internet appealing for protests on 1 October 2019 in six districts (Tuen Mun, Hong Kong Island, Tsuen Wan, Wong Tai Sin, Sham Shui Po, Shatin) on the National Day.



Image 10: Poster with profanity as title with appeal for '1 October 2019 – Six Districts (Tuen Mun, Hong Kong Island, Tsuen Wan, Wong Tai Sin, Sham Shui Po, Shatin) celebrate National Day with the Fire of Revolution that cannot be stopped'
(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 11: 1 October 2019 – 'No National Celebration, Only National Tragedy'
(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 12: Online appeals mobilised people to attend protests in six districts (六區開花) on the "Day of National Mourning (國殤日)"
(Image source: LIHKG)

15. Visuals with pop art designs could much engage young generations. The following are some examples of online appeals mobilising people to attend protests in five districts (Admiralty, Tsuen Wan, Wong Tai Sin, Shatin, Tuen Mun) and join the strike. The strike on 11 November 2019 was one of the major events widely covered by the media.

Image 13: "Blossom in five districts,
Take Your Position"
(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 14: Calls for General Strike
(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 15: Poster calling for General Strike on
11 November 2019,
with gathering in 18 Districts
(Image Source: LIHKG)

Image 16: Appealing for General Strike
on 13 November 2019
(Image Source: LIHKG)

"Blossom Everywhere"

16. One of the characteristics of the POEs originating from the Fugitive Offenders Bill is that the protest activities have not been only centralised in traditional busy, commercial or central business districts like Admiralty, Central or Tsim Sha Tsui. Assemblies and processions have been held in different districts among the territories in residential areas like Tseung Kwan O, Yau Tong, Sha Tin and Wong Tai Sin, and even remote New Territories areas like Tin Shui Wai, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long.

Image 17: Poster to advertise public procession at Shatin on 14 July 2019 – stand up for your family
(Image source: LIHKG)

17. Some people who might not be so involved with objection to the Fugitive Offenders Bill but have been long unsatisfied with some district matters are engaged in these district activities. People's grievance on matters concerning their livelihood like the problems of parallel trading activities in Sheung Shui and the nuisance caused by those singing "Big Aunties" in Tuen Mun became subjects of the district processions.

Image 18: Two posters titled: 'Liberate Sheung Shui' to advertise a gathering on 13 July 2019 at the Sheung Shui Garden No. 1

(Image source: HK01)

Image 19: Two posters titled: 'Liberate Tuen Mun Park' to advertise a gathering on 6 July 2019 at San Wo Lane Playground

(Image source: LIHKG)

18. These district events did absorb and further unify a large portion of participants as they share common interest in the same neighbourhood on top of the demands raised in the POEs arising from the Fugitive Offenders Bill. In fact, by these events, some giant chat groups of the neighbourhood were formed like 'Shatin Group' [11] and 'Tseung Kwan O Group' [12] which did unify protesters in those districts and boost not only their participation but also their sense of belonging in the POEs they participated. The formation of these chat groups helped to fuel their grudges or dissatisfaction on district matters onto the POEs.

---

11 Facebook Group "Shatin". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/751264848301326/photos/

12 Facebook Group "Tseung Kwan O". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/1063204770469453/

Image 20: Poster advertising processions on 11 August 2019
at Sham Shui Po and Hong Kong Island East
(Image source: LIHKG)

B. <u>Sharing information on how to act in concert to assist the violent protesters in the clashes with the Police</u>

19. Though the protest has been described as leaderless and 'no central stage', discussions and dissemination of information on the internet is an organic process that, through the interaction of the netizens, some sophisticated or practical opinions would stand out and become noticeable, and adopted by the protesters. The following post is a typical example showing that, though the author of the post did not hold out to be an expert, his advices was 'liked' by at least 1 572 netizens.

Image 21: Instructions on how to participate in the protests on 2 November 2019
in terms of what to wear, bring and act
(Image Source: LIHKG)

20. Social media provides an easy and convenient forum for protesters to discuss and exchange ideas in tactics of combatting Police actions. For instance, after 21 July incident (For details please refer to Chapter 10), there were discussion on the internet on how to act in response to the attack in Yuen Long.

「長期置頂」727元朗反鄉黑遊行終極攻略

2192 15

再從長計議。

1. 直接衝殺入村是否理智？

我絕對明白好多手足既憤怒，作為一個係元朗長大既人我更加體諒到你地既心情，更唔好話當日係西鐵站裏面既受害者。但係你地覺得由星期一凌晨開始講起既光復元朗班圍村佬會唔知道？會唔準備？坦白講如果我地貿貿然衝入村基本上同警犬當日衝入沙田新城市廣場一樣，你唔知人地裏面有無咩埋伏，人地係屋裏面由上而下飛把刀落黎你點擋？黑社會就爛命一條，兄弟損失一個都嫌多。

2. 分化會唔會比一棍打沉一船人好？

以牙還牙既道理大家都明，但係唔係狗咬你一啖你就要咬返佢轉頭。雖然大家呢幾日都牛屎佬圍村狗咁樣叫佢地，但大家都唔好忽略其實有好多圍村巴絲係企我地呢邊。如果你燒村或者拆祠堂基本上就係得罪曬所有圍村既人，同埋更加坐實暴徒之名。

小總結：

我地非常不贊同直接衝入村裏面開拖，最重要既原因係巴絲們既安危，大家可能唔知其實祠堂係係村裏面最入既地方，而祠堂後面就係山，基本上無地方可以走。第二就係講白少少呢場抗鄉黑運動其實就係抗白色恐怖，要俾個Signal政府話俾佢地聽我地唔驚白色恐怖。我地建議可以圍住南邊圍既門口，姐係佢正門牌匾位置，同時亦係佢地鄉公所既正門。我地認為應該做返我地最熟悉既野，當佢警總咁樣圍。塗鴉、dum雞蛋之類既野乜都可以做（大家發揮創意）。如果佢地忍住唔出黎既，我覺得俾到個信號話俾大家知我地係唔驚白色恐怖既就已經叫成功。如果佢地出黎既，唔好猶疑，打到佢老母個墳都唔認得。重點係，去得南邊圍既就一定要齊裝！

逃生路線：

1

非常非常重要！一定要！一群人一齊離開唔可以落單！

最理想既情況係，無論發生咩事都好入夜後一兩個鐘就點都向元朗西鐵站方向走。今次唔同對付黑警，黑

Image 22: Tactical discussion on the 27 July 2019 procession to counter the Yuen Long villager triads on 28 July 2019

(Image source: LIHKG)



[急] [沙田友人] 關於聽日嘅遊行...

14 3

2019年9月30日 21:03:10

#4 [redacted] P • 7 個月前

2019年9月30日 21:03:10

聽日出去前睇左先

來自CSD職員既提醒

https://lih.kg/1603297

- 分享自 LIHKG 討論區

你班勇武手足,同我聽住,有部份前線手足認識我地,之前幾場戰役我地合作過,最初有人以為我地係鬼,詳細唔多講,我地係一班受過專業防暴訓練懲教署職員,之前已經係現場教過大家,如何組織防線同攻擊防暴,之前都有唔少進步,但今日我地冇出現,你地表現太差,中要咁多比人拉,我好心痛..

我地人手有限,身份問題,冇可能次次出現,我係度比些少資訊大家,希望大家務必share同發輝得好D

1.速龍都係人,佢地咩住咁重裝備同蒙面先至令信心大增,但大家留意下佢地人手一定唔夠手足多,只要大家穩固防線,只要佢地一跑出嚟,手足唔走向前攻,先用人火同磚頭攻,再快速向前推進, 趁機會足幾個差人抬去自己方向,呢個時候繼續用磚頭攻擊,同時向差人方向口射洗潔精地下,務別令佢地仆街,最重要立即除佢哋面具,之後私了..佢地以後就會驚..

2.佩槍唔係向上蚊,而係向內45度角向前推,大家明點做😁

3.如果執到警槍,同佢地玩過遊戲,逐粒子彈唔小心跌落坑渠,洗手間,包保玩殘佢地...

4.咁黑仔有狗用槍指你,可行情況試下用1秒用長竹,或雨傘打佢手同向上..

5如果打狗,唔該搵手足集中打腳,上半身有盾牌你打係冇用,要傷腳同關節先有足,以上除左增強攻擊同防護能力之外,就係要令到狗驚,你要記住佢地都係人,唔係超人...

6.哨兵必須去遠少少,手足唔好集足一個地方,必須快速移動,不停向唔同地方攻擊,切斷差人增援,攻擊完立即走人,玩殘班狗..

7.盡量引班狗去橋下,用高空方式攻擊..

最後10.1見,大家努力

Image 23: Seven points of tactical advice on how to combat the police allegedly offered by someone purported to be a member of the Correctional Services Department Anti-riot Unit

(Image source: LIHKG)



「宣佈」政府若不在今個星期六之前宣佈成立獨立調查委員會…

306 13

2019年10月28日 08:27:14

#1 • 5 個月前

警隊自6.12起不斷墮落，出現警暴、濫用私刑、非禮、串通黑社會、每日四點鐘以謊言誤導群眾、在沒有身分證明下行使警權等等。
至今已過去四個多月，仍未見任何一位犯罪嘅警察得到懲罰，亦未見警方作出任何道歉。若然香港的法制已經失效，那麼人民從制度外尋求公義將是理所當然。

若然政府不能在11月1日前向全港市民擔保成立獨立調查委員會調查警暴，並承諾嚴懲犯罪的黑警，我等將於11月2日起全民替天行道，以我們的方式懲罰警隊。

//升級內容

11月2日起，
1）每逢遊行路經嘅閉路電視全部破壞，務求令警方無力追查示威者。
（若然係企係我地呢邊，或者唔想蒙受閉路電視被毀壞嘅損失，請於11月2日收起閉路電視。）
我等保證絕不會向中資以外的店鋪進行破壞，請放心收起閉路電視。
//我相信好多人唔敢成為勇武，好大可能都係怕閉路，所以增加左爆閉路呢樣野。我亦斷言呢個行為將會係行動升級嘅缺口。//
2）全民不論和勇必需跟隨dresscode。
Dresscode：
a)黑色衫蒙面；
//若使用面巾蒙面，被捉到之後你嘅面巾可成證物，因為面巾必定用來蒙面，但普通衫就唔一定。
自行權衡風險選擇用普通衫定面巾蒙面。//

黑色短袖配黑色冰袖/黑色長袖衫；
黑色長褲；
黑色/灰色鞋；

Image 24: Calls for "Punishing the Police by our means" starting from 2 November 2019. A netizen advised protesters damage all the CCTV cameras installed along the procession route so that Police could not trace the protesters.
(Image source: LIHKG)

C. <u>Teaching people how to make weapons, such as petrol bombs</u>

21. Netizens share the knowhow of making weapons on the internet. The following post appeared as early as June 2019 on the internet.

Image 25: A post instructing how to make petrol bombs

(Image source: LIHKG)

22. Below is an online post appeals protesters to bring weapons, e.g. rods and metal bars, and stay together in facing police officers on 1 October 2019.



Image 26: A post on 1 October 2019 appealing for protesters to bring weapons

(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 27: A post instructing how to install iron rods on roads

(Image source: LIHKG)



Image 28: A post instructing how to make iron nails

(Image source: LIHKG)

D. <u>Disseminating fake news or unverified information</u>

23. The most powerful character of the internet is the mass volume of information flow in a split of second. However, information are usually transmitted in the internet without any verification. It is understandable that if a person has already been implanted and occupied by an idea, it would be difficult to change his perception on the matter. The POEs are also characterised by the massive information flow. Different camps spread images and videos to sway public opinion.[13] Information spreads quickly online, sometimes without verification, let alone the origin or the source of most information are unidentifiable. It is therefore increasingly difficult for the public to decide what to believe or to differentiate fact from fiction or what is fake. One example of fake news is an online video showing petrol bombs being

13 SCMP (2019-10-14). Hong Kong protests and 'fake news': in the psychological war for hearts and minds, disinformation becomes a weapon used by both sides. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3032734/fake-news-and-hong-kong-protests-psychological-war-hearts

thrown from police cordon line on 25 August 2019.[14] The video was later revealed to be fabricated. Instead of the Police, it was the protesters who threw the petrol bombs on that particular occasion. An international media mistakenly referred to the fabricated video in the headline in an article. That media later corrected the headline and apologised to the HKPF for the mistake.

24. In response to rumours and false accusations against the Police, a Fact Check Team comprising of a group of inspectorate officers of the Police Public Relations Branch has been formed to find out the truth.[15] The Police have also adopted various channels, e.g. press conference, stand-up briefing, press release and social media platforms, for instance Hong Kong Police Mobile App, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Weibo and Twitter to provide clarifications to debunk speculations.[16] The Police once on Facebook rebutted some online comments stating that male officers searching a female in Tung Chung.[17] The Police clarified that the concerning officer was a female with short hair.

25. There have been many articles circulating on the internet regarding the 31 August Price Edward Station Incident accusing police brutality causing deaths in the MTR Station (Source: LIHKG). Since the incident, people gather at the Station to commemorate on every the 31th day of each month.

---

14 News.gov.hk (2019-08-29). Petrol bomb video is fake: Police. Retrieved from https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/08/20190828/20190828_174312_813.html

15 Information provided by the Police.

16 Ibid.

For example, rumour clarifications on Facebook by the Police on the number of death in relation to protests (https://www.facebook.com/960526577368640/posts/2425119690909314) on 13 June 2019 and on dispersal operation near PolyU (https://www.facebook.com/960526577368640/posts/2763973200357293) on 18 November 2019.

17 Hong Kong Police Facebook (2019-09-09). Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/HongKongPoliceForce/photos/a.965784490176182/2601183943302887/?type=3&theater and https://www.facebook.com/HongKongPoliceForce/photos/a.965784490176182/2601183999969548/?type=3&theater



【831】9月6號1930集氣千人太子站獻花行動post

愈嚟愈多證據顯示8.31好大可能已經有手足被打死
但所有證據就唔係度詳細闡述喇
以下由其他巴絲嘅簡短總結

警察8.31係太子站，根本打死左人

1. 9月4日美國眾議院議長，聲明指港府使用武力導致"tragic loss of life"
2. MTR堅拒比CCTV，之前元朗都有比
3. 消防開頭報control有10個傷者，但後來聲稱點錯，7人送院
4. 消防員確認消防處配合警察作數
5. 警察公布傷者人數，前後不一
6. 太子站無甚損壞，但封足2日
7. 太子站化學劑味極濃烈
8. 有指失蹤3人屬於第一類嚴重
9. 記者會上，龍小姐指出有人被打到口吐白沫，當場無反應，女警叫佢「唔好訓」，後被消防抬走
10. 蘋果直播錄到，有女聲大叫「醒醒呀」，而警察神色慌張，驅趕記者
11. 警妻確認有人當場打死
12. 醫護確認死左人
13. MTR職員確認CCTV影到，職員被滅聲
14. 接連報出多宗命案，部分極可疑：有浮屍，有女子被棍打死全家被捕，有男子從2米高台墮斃

太子CCTV最快星期6會被刪除
我地要有一次大集氣出太子 制造輿論壓力
將831死人嘅概念植入市民心中
令全港市民聚焦落黨鐵 迫佢交831嘅CCTV
絕對唔係要依兩日咁得幾十人圍太子警署咁
一定要上千人
實行將太子站鋪滿白色鮮花

依家號召各位巴打
聽日9月6號1930集氣千人太子站獻花
見字嘅巴打幫手spread出去 一個人真係推唔起

Image 29: Post that listed 14 points to support the rumour that people had been beaten to death by police on 31 August 2019 at the Prince Edward Station, with petition for a gathering on 6 September 2019 at the MTR station to present flowers

(Image source: LIHKG)

26. The death of the HKUST student in Tseung Kwan O arose accusations against the Police regarding the cause of it. There are photos on internet allegedly showing an ambulance blocked by the Police.

Image 30: Photograph showing an ambulance that was allegedly blocked by the Police
(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 31: Netizens therefore opined that the Police had delayed medical assistance for the student
(Image source: LIHKG)

27. The above mentioned incidents remain unresolved in some people's mind and its effect is still lasting. It leads to some people's distrust or even hatred against Police.

28. As at 26 January 2020, a total of 66 press conferences were held and 66 letters or responses in other forms were sent to the media.[18] When collaboration across different departments/bureaus is involved, multi-departmental press conference would be conducted, for instance, press conference was held jointly with FSD, HA and MTRC on 10 September 2019 to clarify rumours in relation to death in the incident on 31 August 2019.[19]

---

18 Information provided by HKPF.

19 SCMP (2019-09-10). Hong Kong rail operator MTR Corp finally releases images of station clashes in yet

E. Tracking of duty police officers' movement

29. In August 2019, a real time crowdsourced map – HKMap.live, was developed to show the locations of the Police. Apple Inc removed the app from its App Store in October 2019 saying that the app was used to target and ambush the Police, victimise residents and threaten public safety. The developer of the app disagreed that the app was illegal and explained that the app had received no legal complaints. Despite the removal from App Store, the app can still be accessed through the web version and be downloaded it on Google Play.

30. A post[20] on the internet introduced the map and encouraged the protesters to "be water". HKmap.live also gathers reports on police patrols and tear gas deployment via Telegram.



Image 32: A post on LIHKG introducing mobile app – hkmap.live on 4 August 2019

(Image source: LIHKG)

another bid to end rumours that 3 protesters died in tussle with police. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/transport/article/3026510/hong-kong-rail-operator-mtr-corp-releases-images-station

20 LIHKG. (2019-08-04) 全港流浪狗位置實時地圖上線啦. Retrieved from https://lihkg.com/thread/1406448/page/1

Image 33: A post on LIHKG of a real time map showing the whereabouts of police officers near the scenes of attack on 10 August 2019.
(Image source: LIHKG)[21]

31. Police's actions and deployment plans in attempt to combat the protesters are defeated by these real time maps. Protesters' urban guerrilla tactics make them "be water" and could always disperse before police's arrivals. These real time maps could also facilitate them to instantaneously work out an escape route free from police's road blocks.

F. <u>Doxxing police officers and their family members</u>

32. Doxxing involves posting online the private data of a person or his/ her families. An unprecedented scale of doxxing occurred since the protests arising from the Fugitive Offenders Bill began. According to the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data ("PCPD"), 4 359 cases of doxxing and cyberbullying were received or proactively found during the period from 14 June to 20 December 2019. It involved 16 online social platforms and discussion forums such as LIHKG and Telegram, and 2 916 web links. The victims of doxxing are from different backgrounds and of various views, among which 36% involved police officers and their family members. On the other hand, some citizens were doxxed after making online comments against the Government or the Police, accounting for about 10% of the total cases.

33. According to the information provided by the Police, up to 11 November 2019, 1 988 police officers had been doxxed. On 22 July 2019, right after the incident on 21 July, the number of officers doxxed surged by 643 in a single day.



Image 34: Poster with title: 'After school opens in September, boycott the police next generation' – calling for students, teachers and parents to boycott the children of police officers

(Image source: LIHKG)

34. The High Court has granted an injunction order[22] on 8 November 2019 to restrain persons from unlawfully and wilfully disclosing personal data of police officers and/ or their family members, intended or likely to intimidate or harass them. When explaining the extended effects of doxxing, Mr Justice Coleman referred to a Court of Appeal judgement[23],

> *"The damage of widespread doxxing goes well beyond the victims. It seriously endangers our society as a whole. For it will instill chilling effect on our society when many individuals or targeted groups or sectors of the public are intimidated into silence or suppressed to express their opinion openly and honestly or conduct their affairs or pursue their life in the way they wanted for fear of being victimised by doxxing. If doxxing practices are not curtailed, the fire of distrust, fear and hatred ignited by them will soon consume the public confidence in the law and order of the community, leading to disintegration of our society."*[24]

35. Another interim injunction order[25] also restrains persons from wilfully disseminating any material or information on any internet-based platform or medium for the purpose of promoting, encouraging or inciting the use or threat of violence, intended or likely to cause bodily injury to any person or damage to any property unlawfully within Hong Kong.

36. Personal information of not only officers, but their families, including young children,

---

22 HCA 1957/2019

23 Paragraph 29 of HCA 1957/2019

24 Junior Police Officers' Association of the Hong Kong Police Force v Electoral Affairs Commission [2019] HKCA 1197 at paragraph 19

25 HCA 2007/2019

were put online. In one case, an officer received up to 300 phone calls per hour from people looking to harass him.[26] In another case, the schools of an officer's children were disclosed. People then threatened to kidnap the children and hurt anyone who go in their way.[27] A social media channel used by protesters to share personal details of police officers and their families was suspended in early November 2019 after the court injunction deterring doxxing, a similar channel opened for the same purpose within the same month.[28] The negative media coverage, social cleavage, doxxing and safety of family under threat are some of the stressors of the Police.[29]

G. <u>Inciting hatred against the Police</u>

37. The hostility of the protesters against police officers increased as the protests continue, with hate messages for beating police officers and their families. While the protesters dubbed the police officers "dog", "Black Cop(黑警)" and "Yijin guys", supporters of the Police increasingly responded to such insults by calling the protesters "cockroach" or "rubbish". The term "黑警" was first used since the Occupy Movement in 2014, after a social worker was assaulted by seven police officers on 15 October 2014. Since then, people used "黑警" to describe officers who allegedly abuse their force or power, or act like triad.[30] The term was found again on news articles, YouTube and Facebook since 9 Jun 2019, and widely used after the death of the male who wore a yellow raincoat on 15 June 2019.[31] The negative feelings of the protesters sprouted and grows as time goes. As protesters have more frequent encounters with the police, the relationship become tenser. The encounters became more violent, people's hatred against Police grows like a downward spiral. When the protesters act violently, the Police exercise a greater level of force in attempt to control the situation. (Detailed discussion in Chapter 6: Police Use of Force in Public Order Policing) More protesters might then join the combat to help out with their fellows, which may eventually outnumber the officers who therefore decide to escalate the force to control the scene.

---

26 SCMP (2019-10-27). Court order on officer data targets doxxers not journalists, Hong Kong police insist. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3034734/court-order-officer-data-targets-doxxers-not

27 Ibid.

28 SCMP (2019-11-08). Telegram social media channel used by protesters for doxxing Hong Kong police suspended after leaking thousands of pictures and videos of officers and their families. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3037001/telegram-social-media-channel-used-protesters-doxxing-hong

Ming Pao (2019-11-16). 高院延長網禁令 官稱暴力示威者「罪犯」. Retrieved from https://news.mingpao.com/pns/%e8%a6%81%e8%81%9e/article/20191116/s00001/1573843801458/高院延長網禁令-官稱暴力示威者「罪犯」

29 Information provided by the Police

30 Wikipedia. 雨傘革命. Retrieved from https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/雨傘革命

31 Mingpao (2019-06-20). 網民自發清獻花. Retrieved from https://news.mingpao.com/pns/要聞/article/20190620/s00001/1560968869579/網民自發清獻花

38. Hatred always come out from anger or feeling of injustice. After the "Yellow Raincoat" suicide, a lady's eye was injured in Tsim Sha Tsui on 11 August 2019. On 12 August 2019, in response to the widespread discussion in the social media about the incident, thousands of protesters gathered at the Hong Kong International Airport in protest of "Police brutality", with signs proclaiming "Evil Police - An Eye for An Eye" alleging the female's injured eye was caused by the Police .



Image 35: 'Police Repay Eye'.

Appealing netizens to overfill the airport and go on strike

(Image source: LIHKG)

39. Since then, the image of a female with an injured eye has been iconic in the POEs.

Image 36: Poster calling for people to go to the airport on 12 August 2019

(Image source: Facebook)

Image 37: Posts calling for people to go to the airport on 12 August 2019

(Image source: Twitter)

Image 38: Posters appealing netizens to go on strike and go to the airport on 12 August 2019

(Image source: Twitter)

40. On the National Day, an 18 year-old secondary student was shot in the chest by a live round fired from close range by a police officer in Tsuen Wan. This was the first injury by a live round, which was subsequently used as a propaganda to reinforce the allegation of Police brutality and to fuel the momentum of the protests. Below is a Facebook post on 1 October 2019.[32]

32 Facebook. DeMos 馬民 - 馬鞍山・民知民 Go. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/DeMosDerivedFromMaOnShan/photos/pcb.1455599177911651/1455594997912069/?type=3&theater

Image 39 *(Image source: Facebook)*

41. Since then, many similar posts have appeared on the internet, which enhance protesters' hatred against Police.

Image 40: *"While they abused you and treated you as cockroaches, you still treat them as human beings? .....Remind you their faces."*
(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 41: "Since the current regime has no bottom line in suppression of the people, then why do we have to give a bottom line to ourselves?"

(Image source: LIHKG)

42. Protests slogans has even become increasingly radical since the enactment of the "Anti-Mask law". The widely-used slogan of "香港人，加油" ("Hong Kong People, cheer up") in previous protests had evolved into "香港人，反抗" ("Hong Kong People, revolt") and later became "香港人，報仇" ("Hong Kong People, revenge"). The demand of "追究警暴" ("Investigate into Police Brutality") further turned into "解散警隊"("Disband the Police Force").



Image 42: Poster with title; 'Hong Kong People, Fight Back' - Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time

(Image source: LIHKG)

Image 43: Poster with title: 'Revenge – Hong Kong people'

(Image source: Twitter)

Image 44: "Hongkongers, revenge" slogans

(Image source: LIHKG)

43. Though the posters or visuals about police brutality seems less on the internet recently because of the outbreak of COVID-19. Protesters still gather from time to time, especially on the 21st or 31st of the months to commemorate the Yuen Long Incident and Price Edward Station Incident. Some hostile messages against the Police are still very commonly found on the internet.

H. Vandalising pro-Government corporations

44. At the early stage of the protests, protesters mainly boycotted pro-Government or pro-establishment corporations/ companies, they rarely vandalised shops. In a bid to cause greater economic damage to those targeted corporations and companies, violent protesters have started to burn and vandalise shops in late September 2019. Vigilantism in the community has become increasingly common since September 2019.[33] On 24 December 2019, the Mong Kok branch of HSBC was vandalised in revenge after the Police froze HK$70 million raised by Spark Alliance for Hong Kong protesters.[34] Glass walls of the branch were smashed and a fire was started at the entrance. Other branches of HSBC also suffered damage.

Image 45: Protesters set fire on ATMs
(Image source: HK01)

33 SCMP (2019-09-18). From vandalising MTR stations to setting off petrol bombs, now Hong Kong protesters are going for fist fights or 'si liu' to settle scores with rival groups. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3027740/vandalising-mtr-stations-setting-petrol-bombs-now-hong-kong

34 SCMP (2019-12-25). HSBC issues fresh statement to distance itself from police crackdown on protest fundraiser after demonstrators vandalise Hong Kong branch on Christmas Eve. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3043482/hsbc-issues-fresh-statement-distance-itself-police

45. Protesters target mainly Chinese banks / shops. The following are some of their "rules":

Image 46: Post with title: 'Proposed Conduct Guideline' against specific business entities (vandalism, no patronising)

(Image source: HK01)

46. Protesters explain their vandalising acts on social media.

Image 47: Post with title: [文宣]裝修手足麻煩完事後痴依啲文宣係鋪頭 (Translation: place these posters in the shop after vandalising them).

(Image source: LIHKG)

47. Some violent protesters reminded others to leave symbolic printings at the venues after vandalising shops or banks to explain why those places are being targeted.

Image 48: Instruction to spray paint specific meaning graffiti
at the entrance of MTR Stations after vandalising
(Image source: LIHKG)

48. The protests are unprecedented and has completely overturned the mode of protest in Hong Kong. It is characterised by a decentralised mode and is heavily driven via digital media. Though there is no centralised mechanism to organise, coordinate and direct the protests, there is a clear pattern of changes of tactics, momentum and strategies in all aspects for spreading and sustaining the protests.